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INTRODUCTION 
For the past eight years, the American economy has experienc­
ed an increase in both the number and size of mergers in business. 
The magnitude and far-reaching effects of this phenomenon merit 
a serious study. 
The first question that comes to one~ mind is "Has this 
phenomenon occurred previously in a magnitude anywhere similar 
to that of the current wave?" If it has. then there is the possi­
bili ty that one could determine what factors are speci fically 
favorable to its occurrence. 
The economic conditions should be examined both in their 
general perspective as well as the way in which they translate 
into motives for specific companies to be involved in mergers 
and acquisitions if this answer is to be complete. This will lead 
to a general survey of the economy during those periods in which 
large numbers of mergers occurred. Additionally. it will study 
actual companies to determine what factors motivated them to merge. 
In the interest of brevity. it is not possible to study each 
case exhaustively. but a short description of a few classic examp­
les ought to be included. 
Therefore. the paper will follow this format I 
An historical perspective of the Phenomenon 
A general analysis of economic conditions favoring mergers 
An in-depth examination of the specific motives behind 
actual cases 
A brief review of the takeover process 
A sketch of three of the most notorious merger cases 
A!~er cOMpleting the study, conclusions will ba d~awn and a 
prognosis of the phenomenon will be given. At this point it appears 
that capitalism itself. in association with certain economic con­
ditions. promotes the merger movement. However. it is only possible 
to determine this accurately by proceeding with the study. 
One further point must be made. The terms merger. acquisition. 
takeover. or combination are used throughout the paper to represent 
any type of business combination. In their technical context. 
these terms have different meaningSI 
merger- a combination of two or more business enter­
prises into a single enterprise. 
acquisition- the purchase of the assets of a business. 
takeover- the act of seizing control of a business 
entity through the purchase of its stock. 
combination- the combining of two or more business firms. 
However. business journalists use them interchangeably. 
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Although mergers and acquisitions have occu~red "hroughout 
the history of ;Jllerican business. there have been three distinct 
periods in which this activity was especially notable. The first 
period dates from 1895 to 1904. and has been labeled " ',:erging 
for ":onopoly." 1 The s econd merger wave occurred between 1920 and 
1929 and has been called "Merging for Cligopo ly." 2 The third mert;er 
wave. which took place in the 1960s (1960-1970). is described as 
"Conglomerate Merging."3 ~hile each period was unique. there were 
certain factors common to all three. A bullish stock market. sig­
nificant breakthroughs in technology. and a stronger econcmy have 
been common to all three periods. In addition. there are some en­
vironmental factors present in the current wave that are similar 
to past waves. Thus. a review of merger history will provide a 
foundation upon which a clearer understanding of the current period 
can be gotten. 
The First Merger Period 
\ofhile the first period of "merger mania" dates from 1895. 
it actually began with the recovery of the economy after the panic 
and recession of 1893. The business environment rapidly improved 
and the stock market became bullish as investment became a nation­
al obssession. In addition. the development of the railroad had 
transformed local markets into a national market. David C. ';Ih itten 
writes in his book. The Emergence of Giant Enterprise, 1e6o-1914. 
about the effects of the railroa d on the business env ironment • 
" '_'::e :. ~c::\ ~ ~ar t\ ,: ,": _: ":·1 :~e r- r e - ~ lv ll. . ::l!" ~ ': i tec ;3~2.~~ S ·· ,0:~e ::,·~':'.::! e :-:.-
~ y "thrown cpen f er :lational ccmpe"ti tio !; , .... "" ",;he:-e ::ompanies were 
once limited to regional markets because a means "to transport their 
goods quickly and effic iently was not available. the development 
of the railroad Gave them a way to market throughout much of the 
country, 
With the opening of the national market, competition flourished. 
Companies took advantage of the larger national market by increas­
ing production; and with the increased output. came the development 
of production teChniques that were more efficient. 5 As a result, 
overcapacity occurred. 
To survive in businessesthis s~ompetitive atmosphere. 
merged horizontally(i.e •• ~e with businesses that produce 
the same products).6 This type of combination served two purposes. 
First. by combining with a competitor. competition could be elim­
inated or lessened (revenues could increase). Secondly. economies 
of scale could be attained because of the increased production 
capacity of the merged firms. \vith the elimination of some competi­
tion and the attainment of economies of scale (and thus the lower­
ing of production cost ) . businesses were able to exert some mo no­
pOlistic power over markets. The increased power and efficiency 
of these merged businesses caused the remaining smaller firms to 
either merge with the larger business or fold. 7 
John D. Rockefeller embodied this phenomenon in his creation 
of Standard c il. He began by combining two oil refineries and from 
that point on he pursued the market until he controlled 90;' of it 
in the United States. 8 Before Rockefeller's pursuit of an empire. 
the competition had been so intense that the price of oil had 
dropped over 50%.9 He r ealized that by acquiring firms. there would 
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efficiencies i~creased. he used his new power in .he r ef inery in­
du stry to create :3 r.ear-nonopol y . ,\ccording "to Ida ~arbell. ~ock-
efeller spoke \; 0 his compec i tors i~ chis manner I "You C?,Il' t compece 
wi th Standard. ',ie have all the large refineries now. [f you refuse 
to sell. it will end in your being crushed." 10 nis approach worked. 
In Standard's "heyday" Rockefeller nade this scatemenc: 
Three years ago. I took over the Cleveland refineries. 
I have managed them so chat today I pay a profit to 
nobody. I do my own buying. I make my own acid and 
barrels. I control the New York terninals of both the 
Erie and Central roads. and ship such quantities 
that the railroads give me better races chan they 
do any other shipper. l1 
'rhe first wave ended around 1904. when the economy experienced 
a recession and the government began to use the 3herman Act effec­
tively in the prosecution of monopolies. 12 r,;any mergers of this 
period failed as the economy soured. Also contributing to the 
failure of these mergers was the lack of managerial skills and 
techniques to effectively run the larger business. 
The Second fi;erger ';Iave 
The next and smallest of the merger waves occurred from 1920 
to 1929. Economic conditions I.ere similar to the previous merger 
period in that the economy was rapidly improving and the stock 
market very bullish. The wave was preceded by the development of 
the automobile and the radio. This created new industries and re­
, ,"~ 
the e:lding of 'lil~ I. ::1any i~du stries werp ove:opr c ducir.g and "therefore 
very compecitive. In r esponse tv the business environmenc. business­
es used merging as a way to survive through growch. In s ome ins"tal1ces. 
it was necessary for firms to combir.e in order to cOr.'lpete against 
the larfer firms created curing the first merger perio d. 14 
The firsc two waves differed in some respects. \'Jhen the first 
per iod ended. the federal ~overrunent increased i ts involvement in 
the elimination or prevention of monopol ies. iii th the increased 
enforcement of the 3herman Act. and the passing of the Clayton Act 
in 1914. larger businesses found it more difficult to combine. There­
fore. in this period. merging took place between the smaller firms 
in an industry; there was also an increasing movement to integrate 
vertically (the combining with a supplier of resources).15 
Responding to the development of the communication industry 
(which was aided by W\~I). Sosthenes Behn created ITT. He did this 
by acquiring smaller firms in both the U.S. and abroad with the 
intent of creating an "International System." Behn saw the potential 
of connecting the U.S. with foreign countries. and therefore pushed 
ITT into this niche marketing strategy. To move quickl y toward this 
strategy. Sosthenes Behn adopted an aggressive acquisition policy. 
as Table t confirms. 16 
ITT 
(figures are-In millions) 
lEQ. lli2. 
Consolidated Revenue 22.7 100 
Earnings 
Assets 
Debt 
7.1 
1)1 
9 
17.7 
535 
64 
Common stock ·5 1.95 
6 
J. 
.. 
5 
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i"t came abou"t only through a progress~v e acquisi ti~n progra'1l. :e n 
Dehn' s plan he not only expanded geographically. but also a.::quirec 
businesses that manufact ured communication equipment (vertical in­
tegration). '3ehn' s strategy was typic al of .he period. 
The second merger wave ended abruptly with the crash of the 
stock market in 1929. Firms that had been pursuing aggressive 
growth strategies found themselves in financial trouble--many even 
folded. This was a trying time for ITT as it fought for its life. 
The Third r.:erger ;Iave 
Cccurring in the 1960s and peaki ng in 1969 was the third and 
largest merger wave. Reinforcing the merger activity of this period 
was a strong economy. and thus a bullish stock market. Also, the 
further development of the airplane and telcvision had created new 
17markets as the automobile and radio did prior to the second wave. 
Firms moving into these new industries were required to adjust-­
this often meant expansion of facilities. In general. the economy 
was very similar to the previous merger periods. However, the type 
of merger that was common in the 1960s was much different than those 
of the earlier periods; the government was largely responsible for 
this. After the second merger wave, the government amended the 
Clayton Act to provide it even greater control over combinations. 
Basically, the Clayton Act prohibited the acquisition of stock or 
assets when the result would be the lessening of competition or 
the creation of a monopoly.18 But not only did the government have 
more power to deal with mergers. bu tit also was more ac tive durinG 
• • -'- .... . , --T 1 • . .•. r-:-, 
.:~i:-ficult fer c-usi!:esses:') cOM"Dine ~it~er verl:icall~' or :"1oriz :::1 ­
.ally; the response to the goverr~ent's increases power and en­
forcement was the acquisition of u~elated businesses (c onglomerate 
merging ) . The federal government was not prepared to deal with this. 
Also pushing "the conglomerate movement was the realization 
of the risk that results from the production of only one product. 
The end of '.\'WII was harsh on firms that produced only for the gov­
ernment. (lith the ending of the war and the drastic cut in defense 
spending. military suppliers found themselves on the verge of 
folding. From this came the move to product diversification to 
offset the fluctuating business cycle (and therefore the reduction 
of risk). This is thought to have been the 'primary motive behind 
the conglomerate movement of the 1960s. 19 
Occurring at the same time were two questionable motives for 
growth. First. the merger movement appeared to be a business fad. 
Growth seemed good since in the mind of the public "a growing 
company was a heal thy one." Secondly. accounting procedures did 
not effectively cover the merger. Financial statements were easily 
manipulated to make the newly merged firm appear healthier than 
it actually was. 20 The early 1970s destroyed these illogical com­
binations. 
The aggressive acquisition strategy of ITT during this period. 
under the direction of Harold Geneen, was typical of the 1960s 
mergers. In the late sixties. ITT acquired firms at the rate of 
one per week. 21 '.vhen defending his acquisition strategy, Geneen 
said that he acquired to balance. the domestic and foreign markets. 
the capital intensive and labor intensive products, consumer goods 
and capital equipment. 22 Diversification was the obvious motive 
her e. C' 'l, C'ert.air.ly not t he onl y O:1e. ·,'Ihen Cene en becam e th e ': :::C 
of I TT. he pr omi s ed to doubl e earnings in f ive years. He d i d: and 
he did it through acquisition. Robert Sobel. in his book. ITT: 
The Management of Cpportuni ty. writes, "The conglomerateurs were 
more concerned with finance than with the development of o n~oin~ 
enterprises: they were more interested in the bottom line than 
in supporting extensive, long-term research and development programs.,, 2J 
But Ceneen was not only obssessed with diversification and the 
bottom line, but he was also psychologically involved with his acqui­
sitions, as was his predecessor Sosthenes Behn. Robert Sobel notes, 
"Geneen wanted recognition from Wall Street in addition to what 
he already had from the financial and business press ..... 24 The 
association of power, control. and satisfaction are prevalent. 
The third merger period ended with a downturn of the economy, 
as had the previous periods. The huge conglomerates that had been 
created during this period suffered in the recession of the early 
1970s. Surprisingly. ITT did well in the early seventies due to 
the remarkable talents of Harold Geneen. 
The review of merger and acquisition history showed that the 
phenomenon was a reaction by firms as an attempt to adopt to a, 
changing business environment. Mergers have been consistently asso­
ciated with a strong economy and a strong stock market. In a strong 
economy growth is both possible and desirable. One way. and perhaps 
at times, the only way that growth can be effectively achieved is 
through merger or acquisition. In addition. changes in the structure .~... of the economy have been linked to each merger wave. Malcolm S. 
.:i 
Sal t er and ';Io lf A. Weinh old. noted mer ge r re searc hers , wr i t e. "~; any 
mer gers accompanied or were stimulated by mass i ve chan ges in t he 
economy i nfrastructure. Typically . these radical c hanges in the 
economy lead to new market 
distribution technologies ... 
rail building and dramatic 
new distribut i on channels. 
defi nitions an~o r new production and 
25 The first merger wave followed rapid 
imprOVement i n efficienc y . This opened 
Preceding the second period was the de­
velopment and widespread marketing of the automobile and radio. 
which created new demand and required mass production. Before the 
wave of the 1960s. television and the airplane appeared as integral 
parts of the American business fabric. and served to create new 
industries and markets. To take advantage of these market possibil­
ities. mergers/acquisitions were a logical approach. 
Competitive advantage surfaced repeatedly as a force behind 
the movement. During the first merger period. businesses sought 
economies of scale. This allowed production cost to fall and en­
abled the firm to underprice competitors. The second period was 
marked by firms integrating vertically. but largely for the same 
reason as that of the first wave, businesses were again hoping 
for economies of scale. Firms were convinced that they could be­
come more efficient by gaining control over their resource suppliers. 
The mergers of the 1960s were a response to the business cycle and 
the desire to reduce risk . Firms felt that they ·could outdistance 
their competitors by diversifying into unrelated businesses that 
countered the business cycler this allowed more consistent earnings. 
The review of merger history has led to the discovery of four 
factors that fostered the activity. They are listed below • 
!. A s treng economy 
2. A s trong/bullish stock market 
3. A change in market defi nition 
4. A competitive advantage 
Even though these factors were prominent in the past three waves. 
some of them will be rediscovered as the current merger wave is 
discussed. 
THE CURRENT MERGER WAVE 
The late seventies (1978-1979) marks the beginning of the 
current merger and acquisition wave. At this time. the American 
economy experienced a great deal of instability due to the inflated 
price of goods and services. As a result of inflation. the stock 
market was undervalued I investors perceived a great deal of risk 
in the market. In addition. foreign competitors had become more 
efficient in operation and had begun to push American firms out 
of the international market. In fact. not only did foreign firms 
drive Americans out of the foreign market. they also invaded the 
American market. Thus. the influx of foreign goods. accompanied 
by the already competitive American market. made for an overpro­
duced market and one in need of serious restructuring. 
It would seem that one of the primary factors starting the 
. ~. , current movement has been the deflated valuation of the stock 
market. At the beginning of this merger wave. stock prices were 
grossly undervalued. "In the late 1970s corporate America's equi­
ties were being valued relative to their productive capacity at 
only 50% of the rate they were in the early to mid-1960s. ,,26 Busi­
nesses with excess cash at this time and who were also trying to 
grow. could find no better way to do it than through merger or 
: v 
acq uisition. ~ven wi t h the bullis h narket uf 1985. Carl C. Icahn 
said. "~he cheapest place t o buy planes is on the floor of the 
New York Stock Exchange •.. 27 The undervaluation of the stock market 
has provided businesses with a cheaper means of growth. 
Not only did the stock market entice American businesses to 
combine. but the increased efficiency and prominence of foreign 
firllls has also been a contributing factor. "As the merger wave 
began to swell in 1978 and 1979. American firms were rapidly losing 
market share to foreign competitors in steel. automobiles. electro­
nics. computers. and other products._ 28 As a response to foreign 
competitors and the saturated American market. American firms began 
to acquire. Malcolm S. Salter and Wolf A. Weinhold in their book. 
Merger Trends and Prospects for the 1980s. write. -The acquisitive 
behavior of U. S. corporations during the 1970s was also reinforced 
by the large scale entry of foreign firms into the American market. "29 
This factor is still prominent. The recent GE and RCA merger were 
specifically linked to the enormous competition of foreign firms 
in the technological industries. 
With the Reagan administration came a different attitude to­
ward mergers and acquisitions. The president has adopted a laissez­
faire approach to business in general. In 1986 it was said that. 
"President Reagan is preparing to propose sweeping changes in anti­
trust laws to ease restrictions on corporate mergers. especially 
in industries hobbled by overseas competition.- 30 Even though this 
statement was made in the mid-1980s. with the coming of President 
Reagan and his -big business- approach. companies had to feel more 
at-ease in their attempts to acquire. 31 In response to this idea. 
-, 1 .2 
many may argue that. al thoCigh Fresi deni: Reagan has adopted a "loose" 
approach to mergers. there is an increasing amount of legislation 
taking place regarding the merger phenomenon. However. a review 
of current literature makes it obvious that the proposed legisla­
tion is not likely to be passed. In 1985. there were 50 bills intro­
duced regarding mergers and acquisitions. but none of these bills 
made it out of committee. J2 
Also contributing to the "urge-to-merge" has been the deregu­
lation of many industries. Regulation of industries protects firms 
from competition as price controls are set for all competitors. 
With deregulation. price control protection is eliminated and firms 
are forced to compete vigorously. The result has been another era 
of overproduction. The oil. financial. airline. and trucking in­
dustries are examples of this. "Deregulation in the finance and 
oil industries helped to promote mergers •.•• but it had a more 
variable effect in the transportation sector."JJ 
In addition. there have been changes in the definition of 
markets. The rapid development of technology has created new mar­
kets and altered others. J4 Businesses see mergers as a way to pur­
chase the needed technology. Also. the change in consumer demograph­
ics has created and altered markets. Individuals that are over 60 
years of age are increasing in number I they are demanding products,: / 
that are specifically made for them. Here again. the way businesses 
have adapted to and explored these markets has often been through 
the acquisition of another business. 
Mention also has to be made of the increasing size of mergers 
r.:1 and acquisitions. In the current wave. especially when it began. 
only the larger of more successful firms had the resources to in­
vest in a takeover/ merger. In aadi tion. whereas these more success­
fUl companies would once have grown in the international market. 
this market is not as favorable as it was in years past. Notice 
in Table 2 the increased number of mergers taking ~lace whose value 
is in excess of $100 million. J5 
TABLE 2 
$100 Million Mergers 
1975 
1977 
1978 
1982 
1984 
15 
41 
80 
116 
200 
Thus. six factors in particular are obvious in the current 
wave. the undervalued stock' market. ,the increased foreign compet-, 
ition. the philosophies of the ' Reagan administration. the deregu­
lation of some industries. the changes in some markets. and the 
increased size of mergers. 
THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE CURRENT WAVE 
The first five factors. which are listed above. have created 
a business environment especially conducive to mergers. And under­
lying these mergers and acquisitions (with the exception of those 
prompted by raiders) is the desire to survive through growth. Don 
Gussow in his book. The New Merger Game. writes, "The management 
of these companies knows that the best way to grow aggressively 
and substantially is through a sound merger and acquisition pro­
gram ... J6 The acquiring or merging with another business is the fast­
,.. 
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est way to grow. Exxon's purchase vf ~ eliance Electrlc is an example. 
Exxon had developed a revolutionary motor but had no means of re­
fining or producing it. To satisfy their need for growth in this 
area, they purchased Reliance Electric to further develop, refine. 
and produce the motor. J ? It would have taken years to build a plant 
and make it operational for this purpose. 
Acquisition is, at times. the cheapest method of growth. Many 
corporate stocks are undervalued in relation to their assets I this 
is exactly what the raiders have noticed. For this reason. obtain­
ing control of the firm through the purchase of stock is economically 
ideal. In 1984 there was a substantial amount of consolidation in 
the oil industry. This occurred primarily due to the undervalued 
stock of many oil firms; it was simply cheaper to grow through 
merger. 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that growth through 
acquisition appears to be much safer. The acquired firm is already 
operational and usually has established a market share. When grow­
ing internally, one not only has to organize his assets and make 
them operational. but he also has to compete for a share of the 
market. This is a difficult and risky task. Procter and Gamble's 
acquisition of Richardson-Vicks. for example, was not only less 
expensive than would have been the development of the products. 
but was also not as risky.J8 Richardson-Vicks. with two proven prod­
ucts. "NyQuil" and "Oil of Olay" , already had a command of the 
market. P&G would not have to develop, produce, and then compete 
for a market share. There is less risk involved. 
Finally. in addition to growth being cheaper. faster. and a 
safer means of expansion, it is also fashionable. The public re­
gards growth and success as interchangeable terms. And growth through 
~erger or acquisition is certainly given to the public by the press. 
The general motive behind the current merger movement there­
fore is growth-- growth in order to survive. Within this general 
classification, however, there are certain more specific goals. 
1. 	The achieving of stability during cyclical change 
2. 	The obtaining of economies of scale 
J. 	The increase of distribution channels 
4. 	The acquisition of an expert manager or management 
team 
5. 	 The establishment of a new corporate direction 
6. 	The acquisition of a firm as a response to competitors 
actions 

? The acquisition of tax advantages 

8. 	 The acqu~sition of technology 
Somewhat related to these goals are two that result from them. 
namely. defense against merging. and the personal psychological 
goals of those involved in the process. 
To illustrate the combined list of .' ' tel'l.- goals. particular 
cases will be used. In some instances the same case may be used 
more than once since. in fact. merging frequently is far more com­
plex than a single goal can explain. 
The Achieving of Stability DUring Cyclical Change 
Frequently regarded as the primary motive for growth is the 
desire to achieve stability during cyclical swings of the economy. 
Firms often accomplish this goal by acquiring firms that produce 
goods or services that are negatively correlated with the purchas­
ing businesses' goods or services. For example. the acquired firm's 
product may be more profitable as the economy recedes. while the 
acquiring firm's product will become stronger as the economy strength­
ens. Table J on page 15 will aid in the discussion. J9 Notice first 
10 
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that Conglomerate. Inc .• and Positive Correlation. Inc. are posi­
tively correlated and therefore their returns increase or decrease 
together as the economy strengthens or recedes. Also. notice Neg­
ative Correlation. Inc. = this firms product is more profitable in 
exactly the opposite periods (measuring against Conglomerate and 
Positive. Inc.). Columns four and five simulate the merger of Con­
glomerate and Positive. Inc •• and also the merger of Conglomerate 
and Negative. Inc. The consistent rate of return in column five 
depicts the desire to achieve stability during cyclical change. 
TABLE )
Congl. + Corr. - Corr. Congl.&: Congl. '" 
Yr. Inc. + Corr, - Corr.lns...- ~ 
1 14" 16% 10% 15% 12% 
2 10 12 16 11 13 
J 8 10 18 9 13 
4 12 14 14 13 13 
5 ...l.L ~ .-lL -.lL ~ 
Mean 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 
Deviation 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 .6) 
This is the theory of diversification. to reduce the risk associat­
ed with the business cycle. The move is logical since a study of 
history shows that the business cycle is becoming more Volatile. 
the 1970s was a period of increasing economic uncertainty 
and instability. The business cycles became both more volatile 
40and more erratic in their occurrence ••• • A business that has in­
vested its resources in obly one area could be in trouble as the 
business cycle runs its course. 
An example of this involves Edward L. Hennessy's (CEO of Allied 
Corp.) acquisition strategy. Business Week noted. ·In the process. 
he built a company with 4.3 billion in net sales into a 10.5 billion 
giant resting on five major diversified business lines. adding auto­
motive. aerospace. and an assortment of industrial. electronics. 
and health products to balance out the company's cyclical chemicals 
and volatile oil and gas businesses· 41 
In addition. lenders often perceive diversified firms as a 
safer investment and therefore offer lower interest rates to them. 
However. with this type of growth it is often difficult to manage. 
Tremendous managerial skills are needed. 
The Obtaining of Economies of Scale 
The classical theory of economies of scale has certainly in­
fluenced the current wave. With the influx of cheaper foreign goods 
into the American market. American firms are looking to gain econ­
omies of scale. with increased size. more units are produced and 
spread over the same fixed cost. ·Economies of scale are the nat­
ural goal of horizontal mergers. But such economies have been claim­
ed in conglomerate mergers too. The architects of these mergers 
have pointed to the economies that come from sharing central serv­
ices such as office management and accounting. financial control. 
42executive development and top-level management.· Tables 4A and 
.4B demonstrate economies of scale. 
TABLE 4A 

Cost of Goods Manufactured Income Statement (per unit) 

Sales price (unit) $10.00 Revenue $10.00 
Units produced 1.000 Variable cost ~ 
Variable cost (unit) $6.00 Contribution margin $4.00 
Operating expense $2.000 Operating expo (2000/1000) $2.00 
operating profit $2.00 
113 ~ / 
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TABLE 48 
Cost of Goods Manufactured Income Statement (per unit) 
Sales price (unit) $10.00 Revenue $10.00 
Uni ts produc ed 2.000 Variable cost ~ 
Variable cost (unit) $6.00 Contribution margin $4.00 
Operating expense $2.000 Operating exp.(2000/2000) ~ 
Operating profit $3.00 
Notice that the only variable in the table is the units produced. As 
production increases from 1.000 to 2.000 units. the operating ex­
penses per unit decreases and thus allows more profit. This theory 
was used when St. Louis-San Francisco Railway merged into Burlington 
Northern. The railways were consolidated. the payroll was cut by 
15.000. and the ratio of operating expenses to revenue dropped from 
• 88 to .821 the industry average was .90. 43 But the reduction of 
operating expenses is not the only factor behind the theory, often 
marketing efficiencies can be obtained. "Marketing efficiencies 
are frequently at the core of strategic acquisition programs. Ac­
quisition of products that use the same distribution channels can 
benefit from great savings in sales and promotion staffs. ,,44 
In addition. as firms grow through acquisition and increase 
their size, "synergy" occurs. Synergy refers to the fact that two 
firms working together as one can accomplish more than the firms 
could achieve as individual entities. This is evident in the hopes 
expressed by the CEO of urV. Raymond A. Hay. regarding LTV's merge 
with Republic Steel. • .•. the combined resources of the two companies 
will create a stronger steel operation than either party can accom­
plish as a stand-alone company.n 45 This term is used in almost 
every merger and can be ~he deciding factor in t he decision ~o 
merg'e . 
' The Increase of Distribution Channels 
As a firm expands its market coverage from regional to nation­
al. or national to international . distribution channels must be 
obtained. What better way to obtain distribution channels and 
move into new geographical markets than through merger or acquisi­
tion. PepsiCo's purchase of Seven- Up. for example. not only increas­
ed its, product mix. but it also provided new distribution centers 
in different geographical areas. 46 PepsiCo. given the success of 
its new product ·Slice·, appears to be acquiring distribution 
channels to market this new product • 
In Stroh's purchase of Schlitz in 1981. Stroh was not only 
trying to gain economies of scale, but was also trying to push its 
product nationally. "Buying Schlitz gave Stroh's immediate access 
to a national distribution network. · 47 Again. with the merger of 
American Stores into Skaggs (a drug store chain) reveals the goal 
of moving into new markets. The merger blended American Stores 
grocery business with Skaggs drug expertise: the Jewel (a subsid­
iary of Skaggs) acquisition expanded American Stores geograPhically.48 
The Acquisition of an Expert Manager or Management Team 
The complex business environment has made the managing of a 
business both difficult and demanding. Top management is required 
to work 12 to 15 hours per day and make crucial decisions "on 
the spot." A proven manager may be hard to find and a good manage­
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ment team is considered a rarety. The market is "wide open" for 
proven managers. The management of a targeted firm. and its ability 
to produce. can be a deciding factor in the decision to merge. 
In the case of the Burli~on Northern merge. not only did the 
firm pursue st. Louis-San Francisco Railway to gain economies of 
scale. but it was also after the CEO of the targeted firm. Immedi­
ately after the acquisition. Burlington Northern placed the acquir­
ed firm's CEO into its top position. 49 Another example is the pur­
chase of Ginos by Roy Rogers. As Roy Rogers was trying to grow 
quickly through acquisition. it realized the need to purchase good 
management to reduce the risk of this quick expansion policy. It 
would have taken a significant amount of time to develop managers 
in its own program. In the acquisition of Ginos. Roy Rogers not 
only acquired additional geographical coverage. but it also got 
an established and experienced management team. 
The Establishment of a New Corporate Direction 
Eventually. a firm's products or services may become obsolete. 
This is an unavoidable part of the product life cycle concept (re­
18 
fer to Figure 1). The figure simply shows the stages that a pro­
duct passes through in its life. Especially important is the in­
come curve I note that income begins to decline in the maturity 
stage of the product's life. A firm must begin its search for new 
products long before the actual decline of the products demand. 
To survive. a firm must look for opportunities to shift corporate 
direction toward other growth areas. As a firm's product or ser­
vice moves into and then past the maturity phase. the firm must 
FIGURE 1 
The Product Life Cycle Concept 
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pursue alternative markets. This is often accomplished through 
merger or acquisition. "Given the near history of the last recess­
ion. there is a realization in many industries that they have to 
50find niches in their traditional businesses or move into new ones.·
A good example of this is the tobacco industry. With the increas­
ed promotion of the harmful effects of tobacco and the enormous 
lawsuits that already have been filed. the industry foresees the 
possibility of a drastic decline in tobacco consumption. This ex­
plains R.J. Reynolds acquisition of Nabisco. 51 And'while R.J.R. 
was acquiring Nabisco. Philip Morris found its partner in General 
Foods. 52 Both Nabisco and General Foods were growing firms which 
made them an excellent choice for firms in a declining industry. 
The Acquisition of a Firm as a Response to Competitors Actions 
A well-planned merger can aid a firm in its search for a 
. ,....~l 
competitive advantage. However. in some industries firms merge 
not to obtain a competitive advantage. but to keep up with its 
competitors. In the early 1980s. with the merge of Shearson Leh­
man and American Express. the financial industry began to feel 
pressure to merge. Soon after the announcement of the merger. Phibro ­
Salomon (Salomon Brothers) began to actively search for a partner. 
This phenomenon is also prominent in the banking industry. With 
the deregulation of the industry. and with the mergers that have 
resulted. banking executives feel pushed to merge. Edward E. Crutch­
field of First Union Corporation states, "People say. Why don't 
you go slow?" He then continues, "You don' t go slow because your 
., 
competitors who are aquiring franchises in other states won't let 
you go slow. They are not making any more of these franchises. 
There are only a limited number of good banks available to acquire.,,5J 
. ",, Crutchfield is attempting to keep up with his competitors. In fact. 
First Union is competing with competitors for acquisitions. 
There is often competition between businesses for a targeted 
, "".~ 
firm. CEOs often feel compelled to acquire a firm to prevent a ...... , .. ... ~ 
competitor from doing so. This activity has been seen in the bank­

t 
~- ,,, 
. ing and oil industries. but the airline industry provides the best 

.' . example with Sonic Air. Writing about the chairman of Sonic Air • 

' .\~ Ray Thurston. Fortune said. "Thurston admits that he: himself laid 
I" 
" , 	 the groundwork for trouble. at first by rushing the merger." Then 
he explains his situation. "if the other suitors had managed to 
pull the sale out from under him. it would have been only a matter . ' . \ 
of time before the combined clout of the newly merged companies 
would have weakened Sonic's position in West Coast markets.,,54 
There had already been substantial acquisitions in the airline in­
dustry. and Thurston realized that he needed to make a move to re­
gain his position in the industry. 
The Acquisition 	of Tax Advantages 
·Often the buyer looks at the target company's net operating 
losses as an 'asset'. because it will use those losses to offset 
some of its own taxable profits.,,55 Not only are tax losses often 
looked for by an acquiring firm. but capital intensive firms are 
also often targeted because of substantial tax credits and deduct­
ions. Baldwin, once the piano manufacturing giant, has now moved 
into the financial industry. Vice president of Baldwin. R.S. Harri ­
son. says. • •.• Baldwin is committed not so much to particular busi­
nesses as to increasing shareholder wealth through two paramount 
tacticsi acquiring cash at low or no cost and avoiding or deferr­
ing income taxes.· 56 Almost all of Baldwin's acquisitions have re­
sulted in favorable tax consequences. Baldwin owns insurance com- ' 
panies, savings and loan companies. and mortgage banking and service 
companies. These companies are very profitable but they generate 
very few tax deductions (investment credit. depreciation, etc.). 
To offset these profits that are not shielded. Baldwin had moved 
into the business of leasing. In this capital intensive business, 
a substantial amount of investment credits are generated (a direct 
reduction of taxes payable resulting from the purchase of specified 
equipment). Also. there are huge deductions for depreciation which 
acts to shield revenue. 
Another example of the desire to gain favorable tax consequences 
through acquisition is Ryder's pursuit of Frank B. Hall and Comp­
any (an insurance brokerage firm). Ryder, a truck rental company. 
attempted to takeover Hall and Company while at the same time Hall 
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and Co, was pursuing Jartran (truck rental company), "Both firms 
recognize that a truck rental company is a capital intensive 
business which generates investment tax credits and that an in­
surance brokerage firm is a service business which generates sig­
nificant 'non-sheltered' income.· 57 Obviously, the two firms would 
complement each other nicely. 
Accounting procedures can also affect taxes . There are two 
methods of accounting for the purchase of a firm. Pooling and Pur­
chasing. The pooling method is used only when the targeted company 
is purchased with atleast 90~ of the acquiring firms common stock. 58 
The procedures that accompany this method are simply the adding 
of categories on the balance sheet together. resulting in con­
solidated statements. This type of -merger structure- is tax free. 
en the other hand. the purchase method requires the revaluation 
of assets and usually results in the write-up of assetsl this means 
more depreciation for the acquiring firm. 59 The purchase method 
is the most commonly used and is the method that most acquiring 
firms want to use due to the resulting favorable tax consequences. 
The Acquisition of Technology 
Technology is another serious phenomenon. It is expanding at 
a record pace. Firms often develop a product. and perfect it. only 
to find it obsolete due to technological developments in the interim. 
Firms that are laggers in its industry (technologically) find that 
the only way to catch up with competitors is through the purchase 
of technology. Kenneth Davidson in his book. Mega-Mergers. writes 
about technology, "To keep up or catch up. firms have turned to 
merger transactions. ,,60 Burroughs, under the direction of ~1ichael 
Blumenthal. had to adopt an aggressive acquisition plan to catch 
up with its competitors. For this reason. Burroughs purchased 
Memorex to close the gap between itself. IBM. and NCR. Burroughs. 
once at the top of the market in office automation. lost its market 
share due to poor research and development program. The company 
could not keep pace with technology by internally improving itself. 
In another case. General Motors acquired two technologically­
oriented firms. Again. it was an attempt to close a technological 
gap (GM versus Japan). In 1984. GM bought Electronic Data Systems 
because of its knowledge of management systems. In this area GM 
felt that it must improve. In 1985. GM purchased Hughes Aircraft. 
General Motors wanted to obtain technological advantages from Hughes. 
-The world'S largest automaker hopes to use the skills of its two 
new units to move into special areas of technology. especially with 
the Saturn Project. which aims to build a small car that can com­
. 61 . 1pete w~th Japanese models.- Research and development was s~mp Y 
too slow a process to close the gap created by the Japanese. 
General Electric'S acquisiton of RCA was also motivated by 
the need for technology. GE chairman. John Welch. said. "We will 
have the technological capabilities. financial resources. and 
global scope to be able to compete successfully with anyone. any­
where. in every market we serve. ,,62 
Defense Against Merging 
with mergers increasing throughout the 1980s. there has been 
a rise in the number of defensive combinations. There are many firms 
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who have been targeted for takeover but wish to remain independent. 
Many tactics are used by businesses to thwart a takeover attempt; 
one of the most common moves is to acquire another firm. This not 
only increases the size of the targeted firm and makes a takeover 
more expensive, but it often leverages (the use of debt) the firm 
in such a manner that would make a takeover suicidal. In addition. 
and as a last resort. a targeted firm may find a willing acquirer 
that would be more favorable than the pursuing business. This has 
been labeled by the business community as a "white knight." 
Western Airlines is a company that may find itself using the 
defensive merger tactic. The company is ripe for a takeover in 
that its stock is undervalued and it is cash heavy.6) American 
Airlines has already approached Western in hopes of initiating 
"merger talk." However, Western Airlines wishes to remain independ­
ent and is prepared to take the appropriate measures to insure 
this. Through acquisition, Western would first be using the ex­
cess cash that is enticing many airline companies·, But more im­
port ant , a merger would increase the size of the company and make 
a takeover prohibitively expensive. 
A firm can also find a willing acquirer (white knight) to 
prevent an unfavorable business from acquiring it. This tactic has 
been used by Gulf in its avoidance of T. Boone Pickens. Pickens, 
it was reported, was going to liquidate the company and distribute 
the funds to shareholders,64 Management at Gulf felt this would 
be unfair to shareholders and therefore searched and found a white 
knight in Chevron (Standard Oil of California). Two additional 
examples are provided under the heading "Significant Cases." 
1. Conoco and DuPont 
2. Bendix and Allied 
The Personal Psychological Goals of Those Involved in the Frocess 
Kenneth M. Davidson in his book, Mega-~ergers, states, ·There 
exists a suspicion that large corporate acquisitions are undertaken 
to satisfy the imperial aspirations of chief executive officers 
(CEOs).·65 Large firms are powerful and are viewed by the public 
as successful. The CEOs of these firms receive the credit for suc­
cess and the power associated with the larger business. It is tempt­
ing to acquire. John D. Rockefeller's thirst for power was noted 
earlier, as well as that of Sosthenes Behn and his dream of an 
International System, Harold Geneen, Behn's successor, wanted status 
on Wall Street. CUrrently. Hasbro's acquisition of Milton Bradley 
is said to involve the power motive. It is said of Hasbro's chair­
man. ·Hassenfeld, 42, has long wanted to be king of the hill in 
toys.·66 Additionally, it is said of Hassenfeld, "Winning Milton 
Bradley takes Hasbro closer to Hassenfeld's goal of becoming the 
top U.S. toy company.·67 
Also searching for power through acquisition is takeover art­
ist Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch is acquiring businesses in the communi­
cations industry in hopes of covering most all of the world market. 
presently. the takeover specialist is pursuing Warner Communication. 
Tom O'Hanlon. writing for Forbes, states, 
By the time Rupert Murdoch retires to his Australian 
farm in the 21st century, his current vulgar 
image will have faded, and he will be regarded 
as a sage who followed opportunity where it 
led and put together a global empire in what 
may be the 21st century's greatest industry, 
communication. 68 
In addition to the psychological aspects of power and success, 
there is the "sport of acquisition." In a study done by Wayne 
Boucher on the CEOs role in a merger, one panel member states, 
.. Nothing is more fun than an acqui si tion as an escape from the 
28 
7
t,;. 
~:... 
; 
,.' 
~ .:. 
, ..} 
, 
,.. 
. 
, !j 
ii," 
:~ .- , ;" , 
-, 
:. 
27 
boredom of day-to-day business. The urge to merge is to break from 
the routine, to deal with high rollers. to find challenges. to 
make quick tough decisions.· 69 One gets the feeling that the merg­
er is treated much like a game. and the ultimate goal is to acquire 
simply for the sport of it. Corporate raiders certainly are in this 
category, although their movements are usually more economicallY 
motivated. T. Boone Pickens, Carl C. Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, Ted Turn­
er, and Sam Zell are noted for: enjoying their business. These in­
dividuals are raiders. Patricia Gray writes in The Wall Street 
Journal, regarding raider Sam Zell, ·For Mr. Zell, money long ago 
stopped being the lure. These days, he stalks companies for the 
sport of it."70 Mr. Zell says, "If it ain't fun, don't do it.· 71 
Sam Zell, through his Chicago-based holding company, Equity Fi­
nancial and Management Corporation, has taken over Itel Corporat­
ion, Great American Management and Investment Inc., and has a­
cquired a sizeable number of apartment complexes and office parks. 
THE RAIDERS 
Riding the coattails of the current merger wave have been 
individuals that have come to be called ·corporate raiders." A 
corporate raider is an individual, usually operating as CEO of a 
firm, who watches companies on the market for deflated stock prices 
relative to the firms corporate assets. When they find an under­
Valued company, these individuals attempt to gain control of the 
company through the purchase of its stock. In addition. raiders 
often look for excess cash or over funded persion plans. "Especially 
inviting are companies whose excess cash could catch a raider's 
eye ... 7 2 A cash heavy company. or a company with an ove rfunded pen­
sion plan makes the takeover cheaper. The raiders simply use the 
excess assets of the targeted company to finance part of the take­
over itself. ITT has been under siege because of its cash position. 
The conglomerate has been divesting its unprofitable subsidiaries 
(acquired in the late 1960s) and has a great deal of cash on hand. ) 
In addition. its stock is considered to be grossly undervalued. 
Several raiders are "eyeing" ITT. 
A cOllllllon phenomenon in the raider game is the "greenmail" 
tactic. A raider will buy a percentage of the shares of the target­
ed firm (a threatening percentage). only to have the company buy 
the shares back. This is often exactly what the raider wants. T. 
Boone Pickens has made several • fortunes" in this manner. In his 
bid for Unocal, he was greenmailed. Gulf also used this tactic, 
and then found a white knight to prevent Pickens from another 
attempt. 
An interesting sideline to the greenmail tactic is the cyclical 
nature that it can produce. Disney Corporation is an example. 
Corporate raider, Saul P. Steinberg, acquired a percentage of the 
Disney stock; Disney felt the percentage to be threatening to the 
independence of the firm. They saw no alternative other than to 
buy the raider's stock. A sizeable premium was paid to steinberg. 
As Steinberg was acquiring the Disney stock, the price of it was 
going up. Speculators wanted to get in on the takeover , action be­
cause of the huge sums that could be made by selling their shares 
at a premium. However, when Disney bought Steinberg's shares, the 
stock bottomed out. Investors not only knew that a takeover had 
been prevented, but that Disney was now in worse financial condi­
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tion because of the greenmail. Disney's shares were again under­
valued. so Irwin Jacobs. another raider. begins to buy shares of 
Disney and appears to be preparing for a takeover attempt. What 
can Disney do? If they use the greenmail tactic again. will it 
not only decrease its value on the stock market and thus invite 
another rai der? 
This type of activity has caused many companies to rewrite 
its corporate bylaws disallowing the greenmail tactic. 74 
DISCUSSION OF THE TAKEOVER PROCESS 
A means in which to effectuate a merger is the "takeover pro­
cess." This method. which is often used by both the firm in a pur­
suit of growth to survive. and the raider. is effective because 
it involves using the stock market to obtain control of a target­
ed companyr through the stock market. enough of a firms shares 
may be purchased so that control can be achieved. and then a merger 
can be forced. 
This technique is appealing for two reasons. First. the stock 
market has been undervalued throughout the current wave. Purchase 
or merger through the stock market is economically rational. Second. 
the takeover process does not require the interaction of the acquir­
er and management of the targeted f i rm. Takeovers allow the deal­
ing to take place between the acquirer and the shareholders of 
the target. 
As an example, suppose that f i nn "An wants to obtain control 
of firm "B". B has created an important technological process. 
which A hopes to acquire, yet its stock is undervalued. To gain 
control of B. A could approach B's management with the offer of 
a merger agreement. or A might consider buying the assets of Br 
however. it is more likely that a cheaper price would be possible 
through a takeover. If using the takeover process. firm A would 
than buy as much stock as it could on the open market at the under­
valued price (up to 10~). When A has 10~ of B's shares. then A must 
file with the FTC a statement regarding its intentions (investment 
or takeover). Subsequent to the filing of this notice. A would 
then make a "tender offer" to the shareholders of B for a specified 
price per share. and a specified percentage wanted. (the acquiring 
firm hopes to entice the targeted shareholders to sell it..,_ their 
shares). The tender offer price will be above the market price and 
the percentage wanted will push the firm close to 51%. (with 51% 
of a firms shares control is established). At this point. B may 
either allow the takeover and then the merger. or it can use 
defensive measures in an attempt to prevent the takeover. If B 

adopts a defensive posture. then a war may follow as A looks for 

ways to circumvent the many barriers that B could put in its way. 

The takeover process cbviously is an extremely complex pro­

cess. consuming much of both time and money. 

" SIGNIFICANT CASES 
Three merger cases are included at this point to provide ex­
amples of the merger activity that is occurring in business today. 
These cases have received much public attention. and have often 
been the basis upon which the government has enacted merger legis­
lation. While the DuPont-Conoco and the Allied-Bendix cases demon­
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strate "merger wars' "tha"t have occurred, the Chevron-Gulf case 
shows the government's concern regarding the mergers in the oil 
industry. 
Chevron (Standard Oil of Californi~) and Gulf 
In 1984, a substantial amount of consolidation took place in 
the oil industry, Contributing to this was the undervaluation of 
oil stocks in the market, Influencing the depressed price of oil 
stocks at this time was the uncertainty regarding the oil industry, 
Americans had curtailed their use of oill this resulted in over­
production in the industry, In addition, oil reserves were becom­
ing harder to find and therefore drilling expenses were rapidly 
increasing. Obviously, there was a serious amount of risk associated 
with the oil industry. 
The largest acquisition taking place in this period was Chevron's 
purchase of Gulf ($1).) billion). And with this acquisition, , a 
great deal of debate took place in the U.S. Senate as to the effects 
of consolidation in the oil industry. George M. Keller, chairman 
of Chevron, and T. Boone Pickens, a corporate raider who initiated 
the Chevron-Gulf merger, were ordered to appear before the Senate. 
The information that interested the Senate concerned the merger's 
effect on oil exploration. With merging going on throughout the 
industry, and the combining of oil reserves, would this not reduce 
exploration by U.S. firms and create a greater reliance on foreign 
firms in the future? The Senate realized that, through the merger, 
Chevron would have huge reserves of oil and could curtail its own 
exploration. In defense of the merger, Keller assured the Senate 
that the exploration of oil would not be sidetracked. Keller said, 
"This merger will bring together SOCAL's (Chevron) and Gulf's tech­
nical and human resources in a new combination that we believe will 
provide a more effective program of exploration than the companies 
are carrying on tOday.·75 Keller further defended the combination 
by explaining Pickens' plan for the oil company. Pickens', it was 
rumored. planned to liquidate the company if he took control. Thou­
sands would lose their jobs if this were allowed. 
Pickens was also required to testifY. In his statement, he 
strongly opposed any regulation of the merger activity taking place 
in the oil industry. Pickens argued that the industry was restruct­. 
uring itself and mergers were the way of accomplishing this. He 
also firmly believed in mergers as promoters of efficiency in mis­
managed companies; mismanaged companies are usually inefficient, 
unprofitable. and are perceived by investors as risky investments 
(therefore, their stock price falls and invites a takeover). Also, 
in response to the Senate's fear of reduced oil exploration. Pick­
ens argues that oil reserves are becoming more difficult to find-­
the problem is not the reduced exploration for oil. Pickens' state­
ment was convincing and very much in favor of the Chevron-Gulf 
merger. The merger was riot delayed. 
The Chevron-Gulf merger was initiated by T. Boone Pickens' 
threatened takeover of Gulf. To avoid this takeover. Gulf approach~ 
ed Chevron hoping that the firm would become its white knight I 
they faced liquidation if T. Boone obtained control. However, no 
company rescues another without more logical reasoning. Chevron 
did have much to gain from the purchase. Listed below are some of 
the growth motives that pertain to the merger. 
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1. 	Gulf had a substantial amount of oil reserves 
2. 	Chevron would obtain access to new geographical 
markets 
3. 	Economies of scale could be further attained 
4. 	synergy would result (the firms would be more 
effective together than apart) 
Allied and Bendix 
Without a doubt. one of the most famous cases in the history 
of mergers and acquisitions occurred in 1982 when Bendix attempt­
ed to acquire Martin Marietta. The scenario began on August 25. 
1982 as Bendix offered $43.00 a share for 45% of Martin Marietta's 
stock. At this time. Martin Marietta's stock was undervaluedr this 
combined with its highly technological processes made it an attract­
ive target. Bendix. in its attempt to takeover (or force a merger) 
Martin Marietta. expected very little. if any, trouble from Marietta. 
They were certainly wrong. On August 30. in response to Bendix's 
tender offer, Martin Marietta made a counter offer for Bendix (this 
is called the "Pac-Man" approach). Bendix took this move lightly 
and still expected the takeover to proceed as planned. Martin 
Marietta also altered its corporate bylaws stating that if Bendix 
bought the shares tendered by Martin Marietta shareholders. then 
Marietta will be required by law to buy the shares tendered to it 
by Bendix shareholders. Another interesting fact was that Martin 
Marietta was incorporated in Maryland . The corporate law of Mary­
land states that the board of directors can only be elected at a 
shareholder's meetingl also. shareholders must be given ten days 
notice prior to this meeting. However. Bendix was incorporated 
in Delaware. Corporate law in this state specifies that the board 
of directors can be elected by a majority of shareholders at any 
time. So. although Bendix had made its tender offer five days be­
fore Martin Marietta. Marietta would have the first chance of 
control (Bendix must give Marietta's shareholders ten days notice 
before they could elect themselves to the board of directors). 
Martin Marietta. after the twenty day waiting period required by 
the FTC. and if tendered enough shares. could elect themselves to 
the "board" at Bendix iDllllediately. 
The turning point in this ordeal occurred when Marietta struck 
a deal with the CEO of United Technologies Corporation. Harry Gray. 
to 	back up Marietta's tender offer should it fail. With this move. 
Marietta added credibility to its tender offer. In fact the agree­
ment was so convincing that the trustee administering the ESOP 
(Employee Stock Ownership Plan) at Bendix tendered his shares (23%). 
Meanwhile. Bendix is tendered or bought 52.7% of Marietta and 
continued to buy until it had 70% (of Martin Marietta's shares). 
But Bendix could not control Martin Marietta because it had no 
. .. position on the board of directors. and could not elect 
itself to the board without a ten day notice to shareholders. 
Within this ten day period Marietta would be able to takeover Ben­
dix. After a long and heated battle in the courts. and with Marietta 
the winner. Bendix accepted its fate and found a white knight in 
Allied Corporation. 76 
The Battle for Conoco 
To set the stage for the Conoco battle. mention has to be 
made of the owners of this company's stock. The shareholders were 
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bank trust departments. insurance companies. and mutual funds. 
These investors in general are not interested in the long-term . 
Their job depends on the ability to produce quick returnSJ one 
of the fastest ways to make big money is to get involved in a take­
over. where large premiums are paid. In addition to the investors 
desire for short-term profits. Conoco was in a very risky situat­
ion (its oil reserves had a chance of being expropriated). This 
factor. which drove the stock to all-time lows. in addition to its 
profit-oriented investors. made Conoce ripe for a takeover. 
Dome Petroleum opened the bidding on May 5. 1981 attempting 
to obtain a 20~ ownership in Conoco. Dome wanted only the Conoco 
subsidiary. Hudson Bay Oil and Gas Co. Dome planned to trade the 
20% (which would be acquired through the tender offer) for the 
Hudson Bay. Although Dome wanted only the 20% interest. to its 
surprise 53% of the shares were tendered. This clearly showed that 
Conoco could be taken over easilYJ a fact that was not overlooked 
by other predators. Conoco settled with Dome Petroleum by allowing 
them to purchase Hudson Bay Oil and Gas Co. 
As the tender offer by Dome Petroleum served notice to the 
business community that Conoco could be easily taken over. the firm 
began to search for a white knight. It found .. its partner in Cities 
Services and moved toward a merger agreement. In this merger. Cities 
Services was trying to invest to avoid a takeover (defensive merg­
er). At the same time that Conoco and Cities Services wer negotiat­
ing for a merger. Seagrams relayed to Conoco its interest in the 
company. Although Seagrams made a reasonabbe offer and agreed not 
to purchase a controlling percentage of Conoco. the firm refused 
the offer . 
) 6 
On June 25. 1981. as Conoco and Cities Services agreed to a 
merger. Seagrams announced a tender offer for ~% of Conoeo's stock 
at $73.00 per share. This offer was substantially better than the 
Cities Services offer and thus killed the previous agreement. Conoco 
again found itself searching for a white knight. 
In its search for a white knight. Conoco received offers from 
Mobile. Texaco. and Duront. DuPont was chosen because it was felt 
that the merger between Conoco and DuPont would be approved by 
antitrust officials. Mobil and Texaco (both"of which are large oil 
firms ) were eliminated because of possible antitrust prosecution 
that would result . On July 6. DuPont tendered for 40~ of Conoco's 
shares at $87.50 per share. This bid. in excess of Seagram's offer. 
killed the Se"agram bid. Conoco also took Seagrams to court to el­
iminate it from the bidding. Seagrams had initially told Conoco 
that it only wanted to invest in the company. Shortly after making 
this claim, Seagram's filed notice with the FTC and The Justice 
Department that it wanted control of Conoco. The courts ruled in 
favor of Seagrams. 
Immediately after court approval, Seagrams raised its bid to 
$85.00 for 51% of Conoco'S shares. Also surprising everyone. Mobil 
entered the bidding war with an offer of $90.00 for 50~ of Conoco's 
stock. Reacting to these new bids. DuPont raised its offer to $95.00 
for 45% of the stock. Conoco was fairly certain that it could not 
eliminate Seagrams. but it did feel that Mobil's attempt could be 
extinguished. To do this. Conoco hired the public relation firm 
of Kekst and Company to spread antitrust propaganda. It was effect­
ive. Although Mobil raised its bid several times. and its bid 
reached $120 . 00 per share, shareholders would not tender their 
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shares to Mobil for fear of antitrust violation if the ~erger took 
place. 
DuPont persevered and survived as the winning firm. There was 
an exchange with Seagrams in which DuPont exchanged 20~ of its stock 
for the Conoco shares Seagrams had been tendered. DuPont now owns 
a firm that will .help diversity its volatile chemical business. 
The three cases that have been presented show the complexity 
of the takeover or merger processr also shown were some of the 
goals for growth. In all three cases. whether the merger was an 
aggressive maneuver or a defensive one, the growth was a means 
of survival,?? 
CONCLUSION 
The research of mergers and acquisitions has led to the con­
clusion that the desire for growth has been the general motive. 
In the first chapter. "Historical Perspective." the growth theme 
became obvious as firms either grew horizontally. vertically. or 
in a conglomerate manner. And the discussion of the current merger 
wave showed how firms have expanded in all possible directions 
in reaction to economic conditions. Growth. alone. however. does 
not precisely explain the presence of the phenomenon. Mergers, in 
all four waves. have been significantly involved in business strat­
egies because they are a means of survival. 
However. this survival technique (merger or acquisition) 
occurs only under certain economic conditions. In all of the merg­
er waves (both the three historical and the current wave). there 
was an expanding economYI the market demanded a higher level of 
industrial performance and output. In addition, as the economy 
became strong so did the stock market. Investors saw opportunity 
in the stock market because of its undervaluation. Another factor 
that has been common to the merger waves is that of "threat"-- a 
threat that jeopardizes the survival of businesses. The first wave 
was largely attributed to the intensely competitive business en­
vironmentr the degree of competition actually threatened the sur­
vival of several firms. Currently, the movement of foreign firms 
into the U.S. market has not only threatened the future of American 
firms. but has also jeopardized entire industries. The;response 
to the latest threat, that of foreign competition. has been the 
merging or combining of firms to survive. 
Ironically. the free market itself promotes mergers. Associat­
ed with the free market is competition. which is considered the 
motivator ("invisible hand"). But within competition. as Karl Marx 
noted. is contained the seed of its own destruction. American 
firms are compelled by competition to pursue efficiency and to gain 
whatever advantages that it can over rivals. In actuality. this 
pursuit of a competitive advantage leads to the desire for mono­
polistic power. And there is no faster and. at times. more effi­
cient way of attempting market dominance than through merger. 
Also. it has been shown that in the American economy is the 
tendency to overproduce. Why does this occur? The free market 
allows the entrance and exit of firms at will; therefore. as a 
market becomes profitable. businesses respond by moving into it. 
Eventually. the market is saturated. resulting in lower profits. 
As this occurs. merging is often used to correct the imbalance 
that was createdr the stronger and more profitable firms buy those 
39 40 
..,.. 
-. 
,... 
.. . 1 
·il 
. ;'J 
that are weaker. 
Mergers have been shown to be a reaction to the free market 
when conditions are conducive to growth. Also discussed was the 
mergers potential in aiding a monopoly pursuit--a negative aspect 
of the activity. However. mergers and acquisitions provide the 
free market with flexibility and allows for the more efficient 
use of assets. Inefficient firms. and firms in receding markets, 
are purchased or acquired, and are therefore redeployed and used 
in a more productive manner. Associated with the three previous 
merger waves. and the current wave, has been the changing or re­
defining of markets. In the current movement, the rapid pace of 
technology and the change in consumer demographics have drastically 
altered markets. Many firms have chosen the merger as a means of 
adapting to this changed demand--in fact, it is the fastes~way·to 
react. The merger transaction has allowed a fast and efficient 
redeployment of assets, and therefore has allowed the survival of 
both American firms and industries. 
In the American economy, mergers and acquisitions are used 
for growth, but as with any other tactic that a business uses to 
adjust in a free and competitive market. it is a survival teChnique. 
The merger phenomenon follows a noticeable cycle. First, 
economic conditions become favorable to the merger. Then, when 
the stock market becomes strong or bullish and the economy strength­
ens, mergers increase in number--they, the merger, peak at the 
same time as the stock market and economy. Finally, the merger 
wave always ends with a receding or recessionary economy. This 
cycle has been followed by all three of the previous waves. 
In predicting the future of mergers. many feel that the move­
ment may not have peaked. Although the stock market is adjusting. 
as stock prices increase. there are still undervalued firms on the 
market, opportunities can be found. However, the government has 
been increasing its investigation on the effects of mergers on the 
economy. If the government increases its enforcement of antitrust 
regulation, the movement is certain to decline. The Reagan admin­
istration, however, has interfered little thus far in the merger 
activity, and probably will not drasticallY alter its philosophy 
in the future. In addition, foreign competition is still a threat 
to American firms, and a contributor to the ·urge to merge.· 
Look for an increase in the number of mergers. 
The merger and acquisition phenomenon is common only to the 
free market. It provides the American economy with a flexibility 
that will allow both its firms and industries to survive. 
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